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Abstract
This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment
and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a
pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract
that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract
would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering
potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may
not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more
cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for
ED.
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Introduction

Exclusive contracts require a buyer to purchase only from one seller, and their possible effects on
competition has been at the centre of attention of economists and lawyers for a long time.
Antitrust courts began to investigate the possible foreclosure effects of such contracts a long
time ago, and the case law contains several examples of companies which have been found to have
infringed antitrust laws due their use of exclusive clauses.1 The industrial organization literature
has struggled to explain why contracts may serve anticompetitive purposes, but by now there
are a number of papers which have shown that exclusive dealing (ED) may deter efficient entry
and which analyze the conditions under which this can occur. This literature on what we would
call ”foreclosing effect” of ED is composed among others by the contributions of Aghion and
Bolton (1985), Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991), Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Segal and
Whinston (2000a), Fumagalli and Motta (2006), Simpson and Wickelgren (2007).
On the other hand, there is also consensus that exclusive contracts may in certain circumstances
serve efficiency-enhancing ends by protecting the relation-specific investment of the exclusive-right
holder against opportunistic hold-up (think for instance of a manufacturer that invests in order to
improve the services of a common retailer, thereby failing to entirely appropriate the benefits of its
investment). This ”investment promotion effect” of ED has been analyzed by Besanko and Perry
(1993), Segal and Whinston (2000b), De Meza and Selvaggi (2007), Groh and Spagnolo (2004) and
Vasconcelos (2008).
Currently, under US case-law the procompetitive rationale of exclusive contracts seems to prevail: it is very infrequent that firms endowed with monopoly power are found to have infringed the
Sherman Act due to the use of exclusive clauses. On the contrary, in Europe it is the exclusionary
effects of exclusive deals which are emphasised: in the EU exclusive contracts by dominant firms
are ruled out by a de facto per se prohibition rule, and efficiency effects are usually not even
considered in competition policy cases.
These very different treatments of exclusive dealing may soon come to an end, as both in the
US and in the EU the policy towards monopolization or abusive practices is being reconsidered,2
and many observers argue in favour of an approach where exclusive contracts must be assessed by
weighing the foreclosing effect and the investment promotion effect of exclusive contracts against
each other.
However, the current theory does not facilitate this task because it analyses the two potential
effects of ED in isolation. More precisely, the literature on investment promotion abstracts from
the risk of foreclosure by assuming that the initial contract is renegotiable,3 while the literature
on potential forecloure (which instead assumes that the initial contract is not renegotiable) does
1

Among early important decisions involving exclusive dealing arrangements, see Standard Fashion Co. v.
Magrane-Houston Co. [258 U.S. 346 (1922)], Standard Oil Co. of California v. U.S. [337 US 293 (1949)], and
U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation [347 U.S. 521 (1954)]. Among recent cases, see Schöller v. Commission,
European Court Case T-9/95, U.S. v. Microsoft (1995 Consent Decree), U.S. v. Dentsply [399 F.3d 181 (2001)],
Conwood v. United States Tobacco [290 F.3d 768 (2002)] and U.S. v. Visa USA [344 F.3d 229 (2003)].
2
U.S. Courts take the anti-competitive effects of exclusive dealing more seriously in several recent cases (such as
the ones mentioned in footnote 1 above). The European Commission has recently signalled its intention to move
towards a rule of reason approach. See the recent Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying
Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, December 2008.
3
The approach used by Besanko and Perry (1993) is slightly different because foreclosure issues are avoided by
assuming that manufacturers face perfectly elastic supply of potential retail outlets.
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not model the possibility that the parties involved in the exclusive contract can engage in relationspecific investment.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to fill this gap by offering a simple but unifying
framework where exclusivity may give rise to both inefficient foreclosure and investment promotion.
We show that the interaction between these two effects provides interesting insights on the welfare
effects of exclusive dealing contracts.
To this aim, we consider a model where an incumbent supplier offers a buyer an exclusive
contract which cannot be renegotiated. If signed, this contract commits the buyer not to purchase
from an alternative supplier. After exclusivity is signed or rejected, (non-contractible) investment
decisions are taken. An investment - which can be made by either the incumbent or the buyer increases the value of trade between the incumbent and the buyer, and may also have an external
effect, i.e. it may increase or decrease the value of the transaction between the buyer and the
entrant supplier. Then, price decisions are taken. If no exclusive contract has been signed, the
incumbent and the rival supplier compete to serve the buyer.
In our model, absent investments there is none of the usual features which are known to
result in foreclosure of efficient entrants. Instead, we show that the promotion of investments usually considered a welfare beneficial effect of exclusive contracts - might make them exclusionary.
Indeed, a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier may be signed precisely because it
fosters investment. Therefore, we identify here a new reason why exclusive dealing might be an
exclusionary practice.
Let us be more precise. In our setting, absent any effect of ED on investment, an exclusive
contract which leads to inefficient foreclosure would not be signed in equilibrium (in other words,
the Chicago School critique applies). The reason is that the contract, if signed, benefits the
incumbent but causes a loss to the buyer. Since the lowest compensation that the buyer requires
to sign is larger than the incumbent’s gain, it follows that the incumbent could never elicit the
buyer’s acceptance in a profitable way. Instead, when one takes into account investment promotion,
it turns out that an exclusive contract which leads to inefficient foreclosure is signed. The reason is
that investment promotion, by increasing the value of trade between the incumbent and the buyer,
mitigates the buyer’s loss due to exclusivity and expands the incumbent’s gain. If this effect is
sufficiently strong, the buyer and the incumbent have a private incentive to agree on exclusivity.
However, investment promotion may be too weak to make the incumbent more efficient than the
rival supplier and the decision to agree on exclusivity, by foreclosing the more efficient producer,
may be welfare detrimental.
We also show that considering the risk of foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation,
disregarding their interaction, does not provide a correct measure of the net effect of ED on welfare.
Indeed, we show that if one focuses on the risk of foreclosure abstracting from investment promotion
(i.e. if one assumes that the exclusive contract is not renegotiable and that it does not affect
investments), it would conclude that ED does not raise any concern because it would not be signed
at equilibrium. Also, if one focuses on investment promotion abstracting from potential foreclosure
(i.e. if one allows ED to stimulate investment and to be renegotiated), under some parameter
configurations it would conclude that ED is welfare beneficial. Hence, evaluating separately the
risk of foreclosure and investment promotion and ’summing them up’ would lead to conclude that
the overall effect of ED on welfare is positive. However, if one allows for foreclosure and investment
promotion to operate simultaneously (i.e. if one allows ED to promote investment but rules out
2

renegotiation) it would obtain the opposite conclusion: for the same parameter configurations, ED
would be welfare detrimental.
Finally, we show that the identity of the investor and the sign of the external effect are important determinants of the welfare effect of exclusive dealing. In particular, if the incumbent invests,
it is more likely that investment promotion facilitates inefficient foreclosure when the investment
has a positive external effect, i.e. when it increases the value of trade between the buyer and the
rival supplier. Instead, if the buyer is the investing party, investment promotion leads more likely
to foreclosure when the external effect is negative. Finally, disregarding the interaction between
investment promotion and foreclosure is more likely to be misleading when the incumbent invests
and the external effect is positive and sufficiently strong.
As mentioned above, our paper is related both to the literature on ED and investment promotion and to the literature on ED and foreclosure, building a bridge between the two. The paper
closest to ours is probably Segal and Whinston (2000b), which shows in a very general framework that the investment-stimulating role of ED depends crucially on the nature of the external
effect and the identity of the investor. The main difference between our paper and theirs is that
central to our analysis is the case where the exclusive dealing contract is not renegotiable, while
renegotiation is feasible in Segal and Whinston (2000b).4 This leads to the following differences
in predictions. First, in Segal and Whinston (2000b) ED does not play any role in promoting
investment when the external effect is absent (denoted as the Irrelevance Result), while this is
not the case in our paper.5 Second, we find that ED may be welfare detrimental also because investment promotion may facilitate foreclosure and not only because it leads the buyer-incumbent
coalition to undertake socially wasteful investment with the aim of extracting more rents from the
entrant (a possible effect which has been highlighted also by Spier and Whinston 1995 in a model
which introduced renegotiation in the setting of Aghion and Bolton 1987). Overall, we regard our
analysis as complementary to theirs.
More generally, our paper is related to the law and economics literature, initiated by Shavell
(1980), which studies the impact of both privately stipulated and court-imposed contractual damages on investment incentives.6
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on hold-up and vertical integration.7 Indeed, both
vertical integration and exclusive dealing mitigate (or solve) the hold-up problem by affecting the
disagreement payoffs that the agents obtain ex-post when trade conditions are to be established.
4

We also study the case where the initial contract can be renegotiated (obtaining results very similar to Segal
and Whinston 2000b) but such a case is not the focus of our paper and is functional to show that disregarding the
interaction between investment promotion and foreclosure may be misleading.
5
Some recent contributions provide an alternative explanation of why ED may affect investment even in the
absence of external effects. De Meza and Selvaggi (2007) emphasize that the Irrelevance Result depends on some
properties of the renegotiation procedure assumed by Segal and Whinston (2000b). Vasconcelos (2008) highlights
the role of asymmetric information at the contracting stage. In such an environment, absent exclusivity the better
informed principal can extract surplus from the agent through informative signalling, but at the cost of distorting
the agent’s investment incentives. Exclusivity allows to resolve such conflict and restores efficiency of the investment
decision. Finally, Groh and Spagnolo (2004) emphasizes that exclusivity may affect the parties’ loss to a delayed
agreement in the subsequent negotiation for terms of trade, which in in turn affects their patience, hence their
relative bargaining power and thus the incentives to invest.
6
See, among the others, also Leitzel (1989), Chung (1992), Spier and Whinston (1995) and Edlin and Reichelstein
(1996).
7
See the seminal contributions by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). See also Hart (1995)
for a comprehensive exposition.
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This affects the allocation of ex-post surplus, which in turn determines the ex-ante investment
incentives. ED exerts such an effect by depriving the buyer of the possibility to trade with alternative suppliers. Vertical integration does not prohibit external trade, but it assigns control rights
over assets to one of the involved parties, thereby reducing the payoff obtained by the other party
in case of external trade.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses its assumptions.
Section 3 presents a simple example which aims at illustrating why considering jointly the risk of
foreclosure and investment promotion gives rise to new insights. Section 4 represents the central
part of our paper and identifies under which conditions ED, by promoting investment, makes inefficient foreclosure more likely. Section 5 highlights under which circumstances disregarding the
interaction between investment promotion and the risk of foreclosure leads to misleading conclusions. Section 6 will discuss a few extensions, while Section 7 will conclude the paper.

2

The model

We consider a model with three agents, a buyer (B), an incumbent seller (I) and an alternative
supplier (or potential entrant, E). At date 0, the buyer and the incumbent write a contract. At
the initial contracting stage, B and I can sign an exclusive dealing contract which prohibits B
from trading with E. We assume that the initial contract is incomplete, in the sense that it cannot
specify the terms of future trade because the nature of trade is hard to describe in advance. The
only possible term in the initial contract, aside a lump-side payment, is the exclusivity provision.
In other words, the only fact that can be described ex-ante and verified ex-post is that B does not
conduct any trade with another seller.8
At date 1, after the contract is signed, but before trade, either I or B may undertake noncontractible investment which affects the value of ex-post trade.9
Finally, at date 2 trade occurs.10
Central to our analysis is the case where the exclusive dealing contract cannot be renegotiated
before trade takes place.11 We make this assumption because we want to assess the welfare effects
of ED in a setting where investment promotion and the risk of inefficient foreclosure can arise
8

This form of contract incompleteness is typically assumed in the literature investigating either potential foreclosure of ED (see for instance Rasmusen et al. 1991 and Segal and Whinston 2000a) or investment promotion
(see Segal and Whinston 2000b and De Meza and Selvaggi 2007). This assumption, albeit extreme, captures the
difficulty of contractually specifying all aspects of performance and allows to study the effects of exclusivity and the
interaction of foreclosure and investment promotion in the simplest possible setting where incompleteness is present.
9
If the investment could be specified directly in the initial contract, exclusivity would not be necessary for
promoting investment.
10
We do not model explicitly an entry decision, and assume instead that firm E can always supply the market
if profitable. Assuming positive entry costs and letting the entrant decide on entry after investment decisions are
taken would not add further insights to the analysis.
11
The existence of transaction costs may explain why renegotiating the exclusive contract may be too costly. For
instance, it may require legal services, or it may involve lengthy procedures and uncertain court decisions (which
might imply that the buyer will be left without consuming the good until the court’s judgment has been made or the
new agreement has been found). Moreover, the negotiation activity itself may involve substantial effort, time and
resources and be quite costly. Researchers usually treat renegotiation as either costless or prohibitively costly. See
Schwartz and Watson (2004) for a recent paper where costs of contracting and renegotiation can take intermediate
values and the contracting parties can themselves influence these costs. Also, a technological commitment that
eliminates the possibility to trade with E can make renegotiation impossible.
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simultaneously. We relax this assumption in Section 5.
For simplicity, we assume that the buyer demands at most one unit of a good produced either
by I or E. The two suppliers are equally efficient (their marginal costs of production are normalised
to zero: cE = cI = 0) but, absent investments, the buyer’s valuation for E’s product is larger:
vE > vI .
If either B or I invests x into their relationship, which entails a cost C(x) = (γx2 )/2, B’s
valuation for the incumbent’s product becomes vI + x.12 However, the investment may also have
an external effect, i.e. it may affect the value of the relationship between B and E which becomes
vE +λx. The parameter λ ∈ [−1, 1) measures the intensity of the external effect. When λ = 0, only
the internal value of the relationship between I and B is affected. When λ > 0, the investment
increases not only the internal value of the transaction, but also the value of trade between B and
E. This is the case that Segal and Whinston (2000b) denote as complementary investment effects.
Consider, for instance, the case of a manufacturer that invests in technical training of a retailer
in order to improve the quality of the retailing service. Such an investment may benefit also the
relationship of the retailer with other manufacturers of similar products. Instead, when λ < 0, an
investment that increases the internal value deteriorates the value of the external relationship. This
case is denoted by Segal and Whinston (2000b) as substitutable investment effects. For instance,
an investment that improves compatibility between a seller’s input and a buyer’s equipment and
production processes or that tailors the buyer’s inter-organizational communication systems to
those of a particular input supplier may make it more costly to use alternative inputs. Similarly,
a retailer may focus its promotional effort on a specific product, with detriment to other products
that it distributes.13
Finally, we model pricing decisions at date 2 in the following way. With a probability b it is
the buyer who makes the price offer, and with probability 1 − b it is the supplier(s) who makes
them. For simplicity we limit ourselves to consider the case where b = 1/2, but we shall discuss
what happens under more general values of b whenever it may lead to different outcomes.14

3

A simple example

Before solving the model, let us propose a simple example which captures some features of the
game we analyse more rigorously below and which illustrates the main intuition why combining
foreclosure and investment promotion of exclusive dealing may give rise to new insights.
Consider first a situation where - like in the literature on the ‘foreclosing effect’ of ED investment is not possible (or is infinitely costly) and the exclusive dealing contract cannot be
renegotiated (Case I in Figure 1). Absent exclusivity (denoted as NoED), trade occurs with the
more efficient supplier (firm E), generating total surplus vE . The buyer appropriates (vE + vI )/2
12

We do not consider explicitly investment decisions by E. However the valuation of E’s good can be thought of
as determined by an entrant’s exogenous investment.
13
We constrain λ to be smaller than 1 because we find it reasonable that the investment in the internal relationship
does not exert stronger beneficial effects on the external one. We constrain λ to be larger than −1 for simplicity’s
sake, but this assumption does not affect the results in a significant way. We will discuss when allowing for λ smaller
than −1 leads to additional insights.
14
The only restriction that we need to impose is the exclusion of the extreme cases where neither the buyer nor
the incumbent has the power to decide prices (i.e. where b = 1 or b = 0). In those cases, one would trivially obtain
that ED can never strengthen investment incentives.
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out of this value: When it can make the offer - which occurs with probability 1/2 - it requires
the good for free from firm E. When suppliers make the offer, asymmetric Bertrand competition
takes place. The incumbent’s best deal is to sell the good for free, which generates value vI . Firm
E can beat this offer leaving the buyer with the same payoff vI and appropriating the additional
value (vE − vI ) that its good generates. In both cases the incumbent does not sell and its payoff is
zero. The agents’ payoffs absent exclusivity are then the ones indicated in Figure 1 (Case I, right
panel). Under exclusivity (denoted as ED), trade with firm E is not possible. The total value that
can be generated is vI and is shared evenly between the buyer and the incumbent as indicated in
the Figure. It can be easily seen that while the buyer is harmed by the introduction of exclusivity,
as it loses the possibility to trade with the more efficient producer and to benefit from suppliers’
competition, the incumbent benefits from it. However, the incumbent’s gain is smaller than the
buyer’s loss, which implies that the incumbent cannot profitably compensate the buyer in order
to elicit acceptance on exclusivity. This is an alternative way to state the Chicago School result
that an exclusive dealing contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier would not be signed in
equilibrium. Hence, in this situation ED does not raise any concern.
Consider now a situation where it is still impossible to renegotiate the exclusive dealing contract,
but where the incumbent can invest into the relationship with the buyer at an arbitrarily low cost
ε. Assume that absent ED the incumbent chooses not to invest (x∗N oED = 0) so that total welfare
is still vE , while under ED the investment is undertaken (x∗ED > 0).15 As shown by Figure 1 (Case
II), the investment promoted by ED, by increasing the value of trade with the incumbent which
becomes vI + x∗ED , increases both the buyer’s and the incumbent’s payoff under exclusivity. This
mitigates the buyer’s loss due to the introduction of exclusivity and expands the incumbent’s gain,
as compared to the situation where investment promotion is not taken into account. If investment
promotion is large enough, as in Figure 1 (Case II), it becomes profitable for the incumbent to elicit
the buyer’s acceptance. However, if investment promotion is insufficient to make the incumbent
ex-post more efficient (i.e. if vI +x∗ED < vE as in the Figure), the buyer and the incumbent have a
private incentive to agree on a contract which, by prohibiting trade with a more efficient supplier,
is welfare detrimental.
The comparison between these situations illustrates the intuition for our first result: the fact
that ED fosters investment does not necessarily make inefficient foreclosure less of a concern.
Indeed, a contract which leads to inefficient foreclosure may be signed precisely because it promotes
investment.
Finally, consider a situation - in line with the literature on ‘investment promotion’ - where
investment is possible and the exclusive dealing contract can be renegotiated. Assume that the
renegotiation procedure is such that investment incentives are the same as in the case where
renegotiation is not possible: absent exclusivity the incumbent does not invest and total surplus is
vE , while under exclusivity the incumbent invests the same amount x∗ED . What makes a difference
is that renegotiation removes foreclosure, i.e. when the incumbent is ex-post less efficient than firm
E, trade with the latter is possible even though the ED is in place. This has two implications. First,
it allows to benefit from the additional surplus created by the more efficient supplier, leaving the
negotiating parties at least as well off as in the case where the contract is complied. In turn, this
(weakly) reduces the buyer’s loss due to the introduction of exclusivity, and (weakly) increases
15

The model will endogenise the investment choice and the effect of ED on investment incentives and will identify
the precise conditions under which the situation illustrated in the example arises.
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Figure 1: Gains and losses from Exclusive Dealing (ED)
the incumbent’s gain compared to the case of no renegotiation, thereby making even easier for
the incumbent to elicit acceptance on exclusivity.16 Secondly, and more importantly, the fact that
renegotiation allows to trade with firm E implies that society can take advantage of the investment
promoted by ED also through the external effect which, when positive, increases the value of such
trade. Hence, ED turns out to be welfare beneficial (vE + λx∗ED − ε > vE ), as Figure 1 (Case III)
shows.
These three cases illustrate the intuition for our second result. In this example, one who focuses
- as in Case I - on the risk of foreclosure disregarding investment promotion, would conclude that
ED does not serve any anti-competitive purposes. One who focuses - as in case III - on investment
16

Section 5.1, where we analyse the case of feasible renegotiation, will clarify why agents’ payoffs are the ones
indicated in Figure 1 (Case III).
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promotion disregarding foreclosure, would conclude that ED is welfare beneficial. Hence, considering these effects separately and ‘summing them up’ would lead to a positive evaluation of the
effects of ED. Instead, considering the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion
would lead to the opposite conclusion.
Of course, this example is very stylised, and in particular the investment choice and the effect
of ED on investment incentives were all taken as exogenous. We now turn to our formal model
where we endogenise these elements and thus we study more rigorously the effects at play in a
setting where exclusive clauses can have both foreclosure and investment promotion effects.

4

When investment promotion facilitates foreclosure

In this section we assume that the exclusive dealing contract is not renegotiable. Section 4.1 will
illustrate the case where the incumbent is the investing agent. Section 4.2 will show that the main
results extend to the case where the buyer invests. We solve the game by backward induction and
we start from the last stage of the game where prices are decided for given contractual decision
and investment decision.

4.1
4.1.1

The incumbent invests
Last stage payoff: the effect of ED for given investment

When the ED has been agreed upon, the buyer can trade only with the incumbent. When the
incumbent makes the offer (which occurs with probability 1/2), it charges the monopoly price
vI + x; when the buyer makes the offer it requires the good for free. Hence, under exclusivity B
and I share evenly the value of trade vI + x . Firm E does not sell in this case and its payoff is
zero. The agents’ payoffs (gross of investment costs) under exclusivity are indicated in the second
column of Table 1 below.
When no ED has been signed, the agents’ payoffs depend on which good exhibits higher valuation after the investment. Let us start from the case where ex-post E’s good is still valued
more by the buyer (i.e. vE + λx ≥ vI + x). We will denote this case as the one where firm E
is ex-post more efficient. With probability 1/2 the buyer makes the offer, requires E’s good for
free and appropriates entirely the value of trade vE + λx. With probability 1/2 suppliers compete
for the buyer. The pricing game is a standard asymmetric Bertrand game. Firm I’s best offer is
pI = 0. At this price, B’s surplus is vI + x. Therefore firm E can win the buyer offering a price
pE = vE + λx − (vI + x) and appropriates the additional value that its good generates. Firm I’s
does not sell and its payoff is zero. The argument is similar when it is I’s good that is valued
more ex-post (i.e. when vI + x > vE + λx). In this case, it is firm E that does not sell and the
incumbent appropriates the additional value generated by its good. The third column of Table 1
below reports the agents’ payoffs absent exclusivity (gross of investment costs).
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Table 1: Agents’ payoffs with and without exclusivity
Table 1 highlights that, for given investment, signing an exclusive dealing contract benefits the
incumbent and harms both the buyer and the entrant. Note, however, an important distinction.
When the incumbent is ex-post more efficient (i.e. when vI + x > vE + λx), ED redistributes
welfare in favour of the incumbent but leaves total welfare unchanged. The buyer’s loss is due
to the fact that ED removes competition between the sellers, but trade none the less occurs with
the more efficient supplier, namely the incumbent. Since firm E’s payoff is zero irrespective of
exclusivity, in our model the incumbent’s gain coincides with the buyer’s loss:
vE + λx
= −∆ΠB (x)
(1)
2
Instead, when the entrant is more efficient ex-post, by forcing trade with the incumbent ED
forecloses the more efficient supplier and it not only redistributes total welfare but it also reduces
it. In this case the loss caused to the buyer is larger than the incumbent’s gain:
∆ΠI (x) =

∆ΠI (x) =
4.1.2

vI + x
vE + λx
<
= −∆ΠB (x)
2
2

(2)

The effects of ED on investment incentives

At date 1, the incumbent chooses the level of investment in order to maximise its payoff net of
investment costs:


x2
(3)
max ΠI (x) − γ
x
2
where ΠI (x) is given by Table 1. Lemma 1 describes the optimal incumbent’s choice.
Lemma 1. (Investment choice)
(i) Under exclusivity, the optimal level of the investment is x∗ED = 1/(2γ).
(ii) Absent exclusivity, the incumbent invests if the investment cost is sufficiently low (γ < γ). In
this case the optimal level of the investment is x∗N oED = (1 − λ)/(2γ). Otherwise, the incumbent
chooses not to invest (x∗N oED = 0).
The threshold level of the investment cost is γ = (1 − λ)2 /4(vE − vI ).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Note that, absent exclusivity, the incumbent chooses not to invest, if the investment cost is
high enough (γ ≥ γ). Intuitively, if the investment is insufficient to make the incumbent more
efficient ex-post (x < (vE − vI )/(1 − λ)), investing entails costs but does not provide any benefit,
as post-investment competition results in the incumbent making no sales (see Table 1). Also, since
the investment cost is high, investing so much that the incumbent becomes ex-post more efficient
is not profitable either.
It is now possible to evaluate the effect of ED on investment incentives:
9

Lemma 2. (Effect of ED on investment incentives)
When the ED is not renegotiable and the incumbent invests:
(i) if the external effect is positive (λ > 0), exclusive dealing always promotes investment: x∗ED >
x∗N oED ;
(ii) if the external effect is (weakly) negative (λ ≤ 0), exclusive dealing promotes investment if
(and only if ) the investment cost is sufficiently large (γ ≥ γ); ED (weakly) hinders investment
otherwise.
The threshold γ is the one characterised by Lemma 1.
Proof. It follows immediately from Lemma 1.
The idea is that, by prohibiting trade with firm E, ED removes suppliers’ competition. When
the investment cost is large enough, this always increases the marginal benefit of the investment
and induces the incumbent to invest more relative to the case where there is no ED. When instead
the investment cost is low, the effect of removing competition on the marginal benefit of the
investment depends on the sign of the external effect.
To see why, let us start from the situation where the investment cost is large enough (γ ≥ γ).
As Lemma 1 shows, absent ED the incumbent does not invest: investing so much as to become
ex-post more efficient is too costly; investing less does not provide any benefit as the incumbent
will not be able to compete successfully with firm E. Instead, under exclusivity trade must occur
with the incumbent and generates value vI + x. When it makes the offer - which occurs with
probability 1/2 - the incumbent appropriates this value. For this reason, under exclusivity the
incumbent benefits from additional investment even though the investment level is insufficient to
make it ex-post more efficient, which makes the marginal benefit of the investment higher and
N oED (x)/∂x). Note that this
investment incentives stronger (i.e. ∂ΠED
I (x)/∂x = 1/2 > 0 = ∂ΠI
effect of ED works irrespective of the sign of the external effect.
Instead, when the investment cost is sufficiently low (γ < γ), absent ED investing so much
as to become ex-post more efficient is profitable for the incumbent. In such a case, as a result of
suppliers’ competition, the incumbent obtains a payoff equal to its ex-post efficiency advantage
(vI + x − vE − λx), when it makes the offer. Hence, when the investment is decided, the incumbent
takes into account that additional investment not only increases the value of its trade with the buyer
(vI +x) but also affects the value of trade between the buyer and the rival supplier (vE +λx). When
λ > 0, the external effect is detrimental to the incumbent: by increasing the value of trade between
B and E, higher investment makes the rival supplier more efficient and decreases the incumbent’s
ex-post efficiency advantage. For this reason, absent exclusivity investment incentives are weaker
relative to the case where the ED is in place, suppliers’ competition is removed and the investment
oED (x)/∂x = (1 − λ)/2 < 1/2 = ∂ΠED (x)/∂x).
is driven only by the internal effect (i.e. ∂ΠN
I
I
Instead, when λ < 0, the external effect is beneficial to the incumbent: by deteriorating the value
of trade between B and E, higher investment makes the rival supplier less efficient and increases the
incumbent’s ex-post efficiency advantage. For this reason, absent exclusivity investment incentives
oED (x)/∂x = (1 − λ)/2 >
are stronger relative to the case where the ED is in place. (i.e. ∂ΠN
I
1/2 = ∂ΠED
I (x)/∂x).
Note that when the investment cost is low (γ < γ), it is precisely the existence of the external
effect that makes ED relevant for investment incentives. If the investment has no external effect
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(i.e. λ = 0), ED makes the incumbent earn a larger payoff but it does not affect the investment
benefits at the margin, thereby leaving the equilibrium choice unchanged. Using the terminology of
Segal and Whinston (2000b), who highlighted first this important insight, the ”irrelevance result”
holds.17
Instead, when the investment cost is sufficiently large (γ ≥ γ), the ”irrelevance result” does not
hold and ED increases the marginal benefit of the investment even when λ = 0. This different result
is not due simply to the fact that the incumbent’s payoff is null absent exclusivity and becomes
positive when the ED is agreed upon. Rather, it is due to the fact that the positive payoff obtained
under exclusivity is sensitive to investment. In turn this follows from our assumption that ED is
not renegotiable so that the surplus shared ex-post is vI + x. Hence, ED increases the incumbent’s
payoff by a term which responds to investment also when λ = 0. Instead, Segal and Whinston
(2000b) assumes that (i) the initial contract is renegotiable so that when trade occurs, the parties
are always able to appropriate the highest available surplus; (ii) the negotiation procedure is such
that ED increases the incumbent’s payoff by a term (the maximum surplus that the buyer and
the entrant can generate) which does not depend on investment when the external effect is absent.
For this reason, ED has no impact on investment incentives when the investment does not exert
external effects.18
4.1.3

Contract decision and welfare effects

At date 1, the incumbent and the buyer decide on exclusivity. Lemma 3 shows that the ED
contract is more likely to be signed when the external effect is positive and when the investment
cost is sufficiently low. Proposition 1 shows that for intermediate values of the investment cost the
signed contract, by leading to inefficient foreclosure, is welfare detrimental.
Lemma 3. (Contractual choice)
When the ED is not renegotiable and the incumbent invests, there exist a threhosld level of the
√
investment cost, γ s ≡ 3/4(vE − vI ), and a threshold level of the external effect, λs ≡ 1 − 3 < 0,
such that:
(i) if the external effect is positive (λ > 0), the ED is signed in equilibrium if (and only if ) γ < γ s ;
(ii) if the external effect is (weakly) negative (λ ≤ 0), the ED is signed in equilibrium if (and only
if ) λ ∈ (λs , 0] and γ ∈ [γ, γ s ) .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
To see the intuition let us consider first the case where the external effect is positive. Imagine
there is no exclusive dealing contract and consider the investment x∗N oED chosen by the incumbent
in this case. By Table 1 we know that introducing exclusivity - keeping the investment fixed at
x∗N oED - benefits the incumbent but harms the buyer, and that the buyer’s loss is (weakly) larger
17

The importance of marginal benefits over absolute profit levels for investment incentives has been highlighted also
in recent papers on a variety of topics, ranging from the effect of buyer power on investment incentives (Inderst and
Wey 2007), the effect of regulation in the pharmaceutical industry on R&D efforts (Ganuza, Llobet and Dominguez
2008), to the effect of market design on investment incentives (DeFrutos, Fabra and Van der Fehr, 2008).
18
A number of negotiation procedures typically used in the literature exhibit this properties, but there are also
equally reasonable procedures that do not (see DeMeza and Selvaggi, 2007 and discussion is Section 5.1.2).
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than the incumbent’s gain: ∆πI (x∗N oED ) ≤ −∆πB (x∗N oED ).19 Note that the previous inequality
is strict when x∗ED = 0 (i.e. when γ ≥ γ) because firm E is more efficient and the introduction
of ED forecloses its activity. It follows that, absent any effect of ED on investment, the Chicago
School Critique applies: the exclusive dealing contract would not be signed in equilibrium because
the lowest compensation that the buyer requires to sign is (weakly) larger than the incumbent’s
gain from having the contract signed; then the incumbent could never elicit the buyer’s acceptance
is a profitable way.
However, by Lemma 2 when the external effect is positive, ED also stimulates the investment
∗ED
(x
> x∗N oED ). This increases both the incumbent and the buyer’s payoff under exclusivity
(the former, by revealed preferences; the latter because higher investment increases the value of
internal trade and the buyer appropriates part of this value), thereby mitigating the buyer’s loss
due to exclusivity and expanding the incumbent’s gain. The lower the investment cost, the higher
the investment increase spurred by ED, the more likely that the incumbent’s gain becomes large
enough to profitably compensate the buyer. Hence, if the investment cost is low enough (γ < γ s
with γ s > γ), I and B jointly gain from the introduction of ED and have a private incentive to
agree on it.
ED can promote investment also when the external effect is negative, as long as the investment
cost is large enough (i.e. γ ≥ γ as Lemma 2 shows). In such a case, the same logic illustrated
above applies and the ED is signed if γ < γ s .20
Instead, if the investment cost is sufficiently low, ED limits the investment. This makes the
buyer’s loss due to the introduction of exclusivity always larger than the incumbent’s gain and
explains why B and I dot not have the incentive to enter into an exclusive dealing contract.21
Figure 2 summarizes the contractual choice for the feasible values of the external effect and of the
investment cost.
Let us now analyse the welfare effects of ED. Note that, when deciding on exclusivity, I and
B do not internalize the effect of their decision on firm E and thus on total welfare. Indeed, the
introduction of exclusivity harms firm E when, absent ED, it is firm E that supplies the buyer
- i.e. when γ ≥ γ so that the incumbent does not invest absent exclusivity and firm E is more
efficient. The higher the investment cost, the weaker investment promotion due to ED, the smaller
the increase in B and I’s joint payoff, the less likely that this increase dominates firm E’s loss. It
turns out that, when the investment cost is intermediate, investment promotion is strong enough
19

We denote with Π payoffs gross of investment costs and with π net payoffs. Since we keep investment fixed, the
variation of the two due to the introduction of exclusivity is the same.
20
There is, however, a difference with the case where the external effect is positive. When the external effect is
negative, there is scope for signing ED only as long as the two conditions γ ≥ γ and γ < γ s are simultaneously
satisfied. This is the case if (and only if) λ > λs . The reason is that γ represents the level of investment costs such
that, absent exclusivity, the optimal investment that makes I more efficient ex-post yields zero profits. The stronger
the negative external effect, the lower the investment required to become more efficient ex-post. Hence, when λ < λs ,
γ is so high that it is always larger than γ s and there is no scope for signing the ED.
21
It is important to point out that our assumption that λ ≥ −1 plays a role for this result. As Appendix A.1 will
explain more extensively, if λ < −1 (i.e. if the external effect is stronger than the internal one) the higher investment
induced when exclusivity is absent harms the buyer. If this effect is strong enough, B and I would have an incentive
to enter into an exclusive dealing contract because it stifles (rather than stimulates) the investment. An analogous
argument applies if we maintain the restriction λ ≥ −1 and we allow for b < 1/2. Note however that in these cases
ED would be welfare beneficial.
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Figure 2: Contractual choice and welfare effects under no renegotiation (the incumbent invests)
to generate B and I 0 s private incentive to agree on exclusivity, but it is insufficient to make ED
welfare beneficial.22
Instead, the introduction of ED does not affect firm E 0 s payoff when it does not supply the
buyer even absent exclusivity - i.e. when γ < γ so that the incumbent invests even absent ED
(x∗N oED > 0) and the investment makes I more efficient. In this case ED is socially optimal
whenever it is privately so. It follows that when the external effect is positive, the ED is signed
and it is welfare beneficial. When the external effect is negative, it is both privately and socially
optimal not to sign the exclusive dealing contract.
These results are stated by the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. (Welfare effects of ED)
When the ED is not renegotiable and the incumbent invests, there exists a threshold level of the
investment cost γ w ≡ 3/8(vE − vI ) with γ w < γ s such that:
(i) if the external effect is positive (λ > 0), the ED is signed and is welfare detrimental if (and
only if ) γ ∈ (γ w , γ s ) ;
(ii) if the external effect is (weakly) negative (λ ≤ 0) the ED is signed and is welfare detrimental
if (and only if ) λ ∈ (λs , 0] and γ ∈ [max {γ w , γ} , γ s ) .
The thresholds γ s and λs are the ones identified by Lemma 3.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
An alternative way to see why ED is welfare detrimental is the following. Absent exclusivity,
total welfare amounts to vE because the incumbent does not invest and trade occurs with firm E,
which is the more efficient supplier. The introduction of ED, by forcing trade with the incumbent,
22

When γ ≥ γ, this argument applies irrespective of the sign of the external effect. However, as explained in
footnote 20, when the external effect is negative an additional restriction (λ > λs ) is required to make the ED be
signed in equilibrium (such restriction ensures that γ < γ s and γ ≥ γ are compatible). Also, when λ is small enough
(more precisely, when λ ≤ λww , with the threshold λww identified in the proof of Proposition 1; see also Figure 2),
the ED is welfare detrimental whenever it is signed (because γ w ≤ γ when λ ≤ λww ).

13

promotes investment and increases the value of such trade - which becomes vI + x∗ED . When the
investment cost takes intermediate values this effect is sufficiently strong to make B and I willing
to sign the contract; however, investment promotion is too weak to be beneficial for society because
(i) either the incumbent remains less efficient than firm E (vI + x∗ED < vE ); (ii) or the incumbent
becomes more efficient than firm E, but achieving such an improvement is too costly for society.
In both cases, ED welfare detrimental because B and I have a socially excessive incentive to use
it.
The Proposition formally states the result that we have already highlighted in the example of
Section 3: an exclusive dealing contract which forecloses a more efficient supplier may be signed
precisely because it promotes investment. To see this, imagine that investment is not possible which in our setting corresponds to the case where the investment cost is prohibitively high. As can
be seen in Figure 2, when γ → ∞ the ED is not signed in equilibrium. The reason is that absent
investment promotion there is no positive effect that can outweigh inefficient foreclosure (remember
that vE > vI ) so that the incumbent’s gain from the introduction of ED is necessarily lower than the
buyers’ loss. Hence, foreclosure is not a concern in this case. Instead, when investment is possible
and γ takes intermediate values, the ED is signed (precisely because investment promotion induces
B and I to agree on it), but is welfare detrimental (because it leads to inefficient foreclosure or
wasteful investment by I).

4.2

The buyer invests

We now turn to the case of the buyer investing in the relationship with the incumbent. The
analysis follows the same steps as for the incumbent investing, so we keep it brief. The flavour
of the results will also be quite similar: the exclusive dealing contract is signed in equilibrium
when the investment cost is sufficiently low. For intermediate values of the investment cost, the
signed contract is welfare detrimental because it leads to inefficient foreclosure. There is, however,
a major difference: when the buyer invests the ED is signed only if the external effect is negative.
4.2.1

The effect of ED on investment incentives

At date 1 the buyer chooses the level of investment that maximizes its payoff net of investment
costs:
h
γ i
(4)
max ΠB (x) − x2 .
x
2
where ΠB (x) is given by Table 1. The following lemma characterizes the effect of ED on investment
incentives.
Lemma 4. (Effect of ED on investment incentives)
When the ED is not renegotiable and the buyer invests, then ED promotes the investment if (and
only if ) the external effect is negative (λ < 0) .
Proof. By solving the problem 4, it follows immediately that the under exclusivity, the buyer’s
optimal level of the investment is x∗ED = 1/(2γ); absent exclusivity, the buyer’s optimal level of
the investment is xN o∗ED = (1 + λ)/(2γ). The comparison between the two leads to the result
stated in the Lemma.
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The intuition is again that, under exclusivity, investment incentives are entirely determined
by the internal effect: when deciding the investment level the buyer anticipates that trade will
necessarily occur with the incumbent and that, when it makes the offer, it will fully benefit from
the increase of the value of such trade due to additional investment. Instead, absent exclusivity,
investment incentives are driven by both the internal effect and the external effect. The reason is
that, when it makes the offer, the buyer extracts the entire value of trade with the more efficient
supplier; when suppliers make the offer, Bertrand competition allows the buyer to obtain the value
of trade with the less efficient supplier. Unless the external effect is zero, additional investment
affects both values of trade and the buyer internalizes both effects. However, when λ < 0, the
external effect of the investment is detrimental to the buyer, because it deteriorates the value of
external trade. Then, internalising also this effect when exclusivity is absent makes investment
incentives weaker. The opposite occurs when the λ > 0 and the external effect is beneficial to the
buyer.23
Note that, absent exclusivity, the external effect of the investment affects the buyer and the
incumbent in opposite directions (provided that the investment is large enough to make the incumbent ex-post more efficient): the buyer is harmed by the external effect precisely when the
incumbent benefits from it (and vice-versa). This suggests why, when when investment costs are
sufficiently low, the effects of ED on investment incentives are opposite in the two cases. Finally,
absent exclusivity, the buyer’s benefit from investment is independent of the identity of the most
efficient supplier. The effect of ED on investment incentives does therefore not depend on the cost
of investment γ, which determines the productivity difference between the suppliers.
4.2.2

Contract decision and welfare effects

Once the differences in the effect of ED on investment incentives are taken into account, the
contractual choice and its welfare effects can be easily understood from the previous analysis of
the incumbent investing.
When the external effect is negative and thus ED stimulates the investment, B and I enter
into an exclusivity agreement for sufficiently low investment cost γ (γ ≤ γ
es ). In such a case, ED
increases investment by a substantial amount, which makes the incumbent’s gain from exclusivity
larger than the the buyer’s loss. The signed contract is welfare detrimental for intermediate
investment cost (γ ∈ (e
γw, γ
es )) because the additional investment spurred by ED is not large enough
to make the gain of the buyer-incumbent coalition dominate the welfare loss due to inefficient
foreclosure.
When the external effect is positive, ED is never an equilibrium outcome. This result is due
to the fact that ED hinders investment, which makes the buyer’s loss due to the introduction of
exclusivity always larger than the incumbent’s gain.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
These results are illustrated by the following Proposition and by Figure 3.
23

For a generic b and high enough investment costs, ED stimulates the investment for λ low enough. The assumption b = 1/2 implies that such a threshold level of λ is exactly zero. When b > 1/2, the threshold is positive, and ED
may stimulate the investment also when the external effect is positive. Viceversa, when b < 1/2 : ED can limit the
investment also when the external effect is negative. However, qualitatively our results would remain unchanged.
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Figure 3: Contractual choice and welfare effects under no renegotiation (the buyer invests)
Proposition 2. (Contractual choice and welfare effects)
When the ED is not renegotiable and the buyer invests, there exist two theshold levels of the in2
2−2λ−λ2
vestment costs, γ
es ≡ 4(v
and γ
ew ≡ 4−2λ−3λ
es ≥ γ
ew , such that:
8(vE −vI ) with γ
E −vI )
(i) the ED is signed in equilibrium if (and only if ) the external effect is negative (λ ≤ 0) and the
investment cost is γ < γ
es .
(ii) the signed contract is welfare detrimental if (and only if ) the external effect is negative (λ < 0)
and the investment cost is γ ∈ (e
γw, γ
es ).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.

5

When evaluating the effects in isolation is misleading

In this Section we assume that after the investment has been done, but before trade takes place,
the exclusive dealing contract can be renegotiated: the buyer and the incumbent negotiate over
the penalty that B must pay to I in order to remove exclusivity and be free to buy from any
supplier. We start the analysis with the case where the incumbent invests (Section 5.1), which
is the one that delivers the more interesting insights, followed by the case where the buyer is the
investing agent (Section 5.2).
By comparing the results obtained in the case of no renegotiation (Section 4) with the ones
that we shall obtain in this Section, we will be able to highlight the importance of taking into
account the interaction between investment promotion and potential foreclosure.

5.1

The incumbent invests

In this Section we assume that the renegotiation procedure is such that the incumbent has no
bargaining power and is left with its disagreement payoff. Differently stated, the penalty paid by
16

the buyer in case of breach of exclusivity amounts to the profits that the incumbent would have
obtained if renegotiation had not taken place and the contract had been complied. The reason
why we focus on this special case is that it leaves investment incentives unchanged relative to the
case where ED is not renegotiable.24,25
5.1.1

Last stage payoff: the effect of ED for given investment

Given the contractual and the investment decision, the agents’ payoffs at the last stage of the game
are reported by Table 2.
ED
vI + x > vE + λx

NoED
vI +x
2
vI +x
2

ΠI =
ΠB =
ΠE = 0

ΠI =
ΠB =

vI +x−(vE +λx)
2
vI +x
vE +λx
+
2
2

ΠE = 0

ΠI = vI 2+x
ΠB = vE +λx
2
I +x)
ΠE = vE +λx−(v
2

ΠI = 0
vI + x ≤ vE + λx
ΠB = vI 2+x + vE +λx
2
I +x)
ΠE = vE +λx−(v
2
Table 2: Agents’ payoffs when ED is renegotiable.
Note that the unique case where renegotiation makes a difference is the one where the ED
has been signed and firm E is ex-post more efficient (if it is the incumbent that is more efficient
ex-post, B and I have no incentive to renegotiate the initial contract). In such a case, the penalty
for breach (as well as the incumbent’s payoff) amounts to (vI + x)/2, which is the profit that the
incumbent would have made had the contract been complied with. By paying this penalty, the
buyer removes any exclusivity obligation and the terms of trade are established as in the absence of
ED. It follows that the buyer chooses to be supplied by the more efficient firm E, extracting entirely
the value of trade vE + λx when it makes the offer, and obtaining the value of the incumbent’s
good when suppliers make the offer and (asymmetric) Bertrand competition takes place. Net of
the penalty the buyer’s payoff is (vE + λx)/2. Note also that firm E supplies the buyer and obtains
a positive payoff even if the ED is in place, namely it appropriates the additional value that its
good generates (when suppliers make the offer).
Hence, differently from the case where the initial contract is not renegotiable, now ED does
not lead to the foreclosure of the more efficient supplier. This has two implications on the effect
of ED for given investment. First, the introduction of exclusivity redistributes welfare in favour of
the incumbent without affecting total welfare also when firm E is ex-post more efficient. Second,
the buyer’s loss is reduced as compared to the case of no renegotiation and, in our specific model,
it always coincides with the incumbent’s gain:
∆ΠI (x) =

vI + x
= −∆ΠB (x)
2

24

(5)

Section 6 discusses the case where the incumbent has some power is determining the penalty for breach.
An additional reason is that this case is equivalent to the imposition of expectation damages, which are the
damages commonly enforced at least in Civil Law countries (see Macaulay et al. 1995, Hatziz 2001 and Cooter and
Ulen 2004).
25
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5.1.2

The effects of ED on investment incentives

Since our renegotiation procedure leaves the incumbent with its disagreement payoff, firm I’s
investment choice as well as the effect of ED on investment incentives are the same as in the case
of no renegotiation. Hence, Lemma 1 still applies and ED always stimulates the investment when
the external effect is positive; when the external effect is negative, ED stimulates the investment
only if the investment cost is large enough (i.e. γ ≥ γ).26
5.1.3

Contract decision and welfare effects

We now analyze the date 1 decision on whether to sign the exclusive dealing contract and the
associated welfare effects. Figure 4 illustrates the results for the feasible values of the investment
cost and of the external effect. A comparison with Figure 2 makes it apparent that the possibility
to renegotiate the initial contract makes more likely that ED is an equilibrium outcome and that
it is welfare beneficial.
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Figure 4: Contractual choice and welfare effects under renegotiation (the incumbent invests)
The intuition is simple. The possibility to renegotiate the initial contract removes foreclosure,
i.e. when firm E is ex-post more efficient than the incumbent, trade with the former is possible even
though the ED is in place, which allows society to benefit from the additional surplus created by
the more efficient supplier. This has two implications. First, B and I are willing to renegotiate the
initial contract if they obtain at least their disagreement payoff, i.e. the payoff they are entitled to
if the contract is complied with. It follows that after renegotiation the buyer and the incumbent’s
payoffs under exclusivity cannot but (weakly) increase relative to the case of no renegotiation.
26

Note that when the investment cost is large enough (γ ≥ γ), in our setting it is still the case that the ”irrelevance
result” does not hold and ED increases the marginal benefit of the investment even when no external effect is exerted
(λ = 0). This different result as compared to Segal and Whinston (2000b) is due to the fact that their (re)negotiation
procedure is such that the introduction of ED increases the incumbent’s payoff by a term which is insensitive to
investment when the external effect is absent, while our renegotiation procedure does not share this property.
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Then, the buyer’s loss due to the introduction of exclusivity cannot but (weakly) decrease and the
incumbent’s gain cannot but (weakly) increase relative to that case. This suggests why it becomes
more likely that the ED is signed in equilibrium. Second, total welfare under exclusivity cannot
but (weakly) increase relative to the case of no renegotiation, which suggests why it becomes more
likely that ED is welfare beneficial.
More precisely, in our model we have assumed a specific renegotiation procedure such that,
for given investment, introducing exclusivity causes the buyer a loss which coincides with the
incumbent’s gain. This implies that, when the external effect is positive, B and I have always an
incentive to agree on exclusivity. ED stimulates the investment. Investment promotion increases
both the incumbent and the buyer’s payoff under exclusivity: the former by revealed preferences;
the latter because πB = max{(vE + λx)/2; (vI + x)/2} and higher investment, either through the
external or the internal effect, increases the value of trade and thus benefits the buyer. Then,
the buyer’s loss due to exclusivity is mitigated and the incumbent’s gain is expanded, making the
latter always dominant.
ED promotes the investment also when the external effect is negative, provided that the investment cost is large enough (γ ≥ γ). In this case, while investment promotion increases the
incumbent’s payoff under exclusivity, it decreases the buyer’s one by deteriorating the value of
external trade (πB = (vE + λx)/2). Hence, the higher investment stimulated by ED expands the
incumbent’s gain from exclusivity, but it also expands the buyer’s loss. Then, B and I have a
private incentive to sign the ED when the negative external effect is not too strong.
Finally, when the external effect is negative and the investment cost is sufficiently low (γ < γ),
ED limits the investment. This makes the buyer’s loss due to the introduction of exclusivity always
larger than the incumbent’s gain and explains why B and I dot not have the incentive to enter
into an exclusive dealing contract.
The introduction of exclusivity may harm firm E also when the initial contract is renegotiable.
When this loss dominates the benefit of the buyer-incumbent coalition, the introduction of ED
is welfare detrimental. More precisely, when the investment cost is sufficiently large (i.e. when
γ ≥ γ), absent exclusivity the incumbent does not invest. Hence, firm E is more efficient, it
supplies the buyer and appropriates its efficiency advantage: πE = (vE − vI )/2. Under exclusivity,
investment is promoted. This may make the incumbent ex-post more efficient, so that B and I
have no incentive to renegotiate, entry does not occur and firm E makes zero profits. In this case
ED, by fostering investment, forces the entrant to stay out of the market. If instead the incumbent
remains less efficient than the entrant, renegotiation occurs. The entrant makes positive profits
also when ED is in place - πE = (vE + λx∗ED − vI − x∗ED )/2 - but the investment reduces its
efficiency advantage and thus its payoff. In this latter case ED, by fostering investment, allows the
buyer-incumbent coalition to extract more rents from the more efficient producer. The weaker the
external effect the larger the loss suffered by firm E; also, the higher investment cost, the weaker
investment promotion due to ED, the smaller the increase in B and I’s joint payoff. Hence, when
the external effect is sufficiently weak and the investment cost is sufficiently high, firm E’s loss
dominates and ED is welfare detrimental.
These results are stated by the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. (Contractual choice and welfare effects)
When the initial contract is renegotiable and the incumbent invests, there exists two threshold levels
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of the external effect, λss ≡ −1/2 > λs and λw ≡ 1/4 such that:
(i) if the external effect is positive (λ > 0), the ED is always signed in equilibrium; the signed
contract is welfare detrimental iff λ ∈ (0, λw ) and γ ≥ γ w .
(ii) if the external effect is (weakly) negative (λ ≤ 0), the ED is signed in equilibrium if (and only
if ) λ ∈ (λs , λss ) and γ ∈ [γ, γ s ) - in this case the signed contract is always welfare detrimental;
or λ ∈ [λss , 0] and γ ≥ γ - in this case the signed contract is welfare detrimental for any γ >
max{γ, γ w }.
The thresholds γ, γ s , λs and γ w are the ones identified by the previous Lemma and Propositions.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The comparison between Figure 4 and Figure 2 allows to identify some parameter configurations
(γ ∈ (γ w , γ s ) and λ > λw , i.e. the area with thick borders in Figure 4) such that ED is welfare
detrimental when the initial contract is not renegotiable, but it turns out to be welfare beneficial
when renegotiation is feasible. To see the intuition consider that in this region, absent ED, no
investment takes place and trade occurs with the more efficient firm E which generates value vE .
Under ED, investment is promoted (x∗ED > 0). When the initial contract is not renegotiable
trade must occur with the incumbent. This implies that society can take advantage of investment
promotion only through the internal effect which, as shown by Proposition 1, is insufficient in this
region: either vI +x∗ED ≤ vE so that investment promotion is clearly inefficient; or vI +x∗ED > vE ,
so that investment promotion makes the incumbent more efficient than firm E absent the ED, but
such an improvement is too costly for society. Why does investment promotion become beneficial
when the initial contract is renegotiable? The reason is that investment promotion can benefit
society also through the external effect: trade with firm E can take place even though the ED is
in place; on top of this, through the external effect, the investment spurred by ED increases the
value of such trade, which becomes vE + λx∗ED > vI + x∗ED . If the external effect is positive and
sufficiently strong, investment promotion becomes worthy for society.
This comparison reiterates the point made in the example of Section 3 that evaluating separately the risk of foreclosure and potential investment promotion of ED, disregarding their interaction, does not provide a correct measure of the impact of ED on welfare. More precisely, imagine
that renegotiation is not possible and let investment costs be infinite (γ → ∞) so that ED cannot
stimulate investment. This amounts to focusing only on the potential foreclosing effect of ED. As
Section 4.1.3 has shown, in our model ED would not arise in equilibrium and the risk of foreclosure would be absent. Imagine now that renegotiation is possible, so that ED cannot foreclose
efficient entry, and let the investment cost take a finite value, so that ED can stimulate investment. This amounts to focusing only on the potential pro-competitive effect of ED. In our model,
when the spillover is positive and strong enough (λ > λw ) , and the investment cost is intermediate
(γ ∈ (γ w , γ s )) ED is signed and is welfare beneficial. Hence, if considering the two potential effects
in isolation and then summing them up, one would conclude that the risk of foreclosure is absent
while the investment-fostering effect is beneficial, so that overall effect of ED on total welfare is
positive. Instead, by allowing for foreclosure and investment promotion to operate simultaneously
(i.e. by letting the investment cost to be finite but ruling out renegotiation) one would obtain a
different conclusion: for the same parameters’ values, ED would be signed and would be welfare
detrimental.

20

Note also that, when the external effect is negative, the situation where renegotiation makes the
welfare effect of ED turn from negative to positive never arises. Intuitively recall that, when the
external effect is negative, for the parameter configurations such that ED is signed in equilibrium,
no investment takes place absent ED, so that trade occurs with the more efficient firm E and it
generates value vE . Under ED, investment is promoted (x∗ED > 0). Recall also that renegotiation
of the initial contract makes a difference only when investment promotion is insufficient to make the
incumbent ex-post more efficient (i.e. when vI + x∗ED ≤ vE + λx∗ED ). In such a case renegotiation
allows to trade with the more efficient firm E, thereby mitigating the detrimental effect of ED.
However, precisely the fact that the investment deteriorates the value of trade with firm E makes
it impossible that under ED society achieves a higher welfare level as compared to the situation
where no contract is in place and no investment is done (i.e. vE +λx∗ED −γ(x∗ED )2 /2 < vE ). This
implies that when the external effect is negative, evaluating the risk of foreclosure and investment
promotion in isolation cannot lead to misleading conclusions.

5.2

The buyer invests

Suppose now that it is the buyer that invests. We also assume that the renegotiation procedure is
such that the buyer has no bargaining power and is left with its disagreement payoff. As before,
under this assumption the investment incentives are the same as in the case of no renegotiation,
which allows us to identify the effects of foreclosure in a clearer way.
The possibility to renegotiate an ED contract only plays a role if the value of internal trade is
lower than the value of external trade, vI + x < vE + λx. Table 3 reports the agents’ payoffs at
the last stage of the game in this case:
ED

NoED

ΠI = vE +λx
2
ΠB = vI 2+x
I +x)
ΠE = vE +λx−(v
2

ΠI = 0
vI + x < vE + λx
ΠB = vI 2+x + vE +λx
2
vE +λx−(vI +x)
ΠE =
2
Table 3: Agents’ payoffs when ED is renegotiable.
Lemma 4 shows that ED stimulates investment only if the external effect is negative. Applying
the argument in the proof of Lemma 2, it follows that ED arises in equilibrium only if the external
effect is negative. This implies that there do not exist circumstances where renegotiation turns ED
from being welfare reducing to welfare enhancing. The reason is that when renegotiation matters
for the outcome (vI + x < vE + λx), the additional investment due to ED reduces the buyer’s value
of trading with the more efficient entrant.

6

Extensions

In this Section we relax some of the assumptions made in the model, and we discuss the possible
application of our analysis to other contexts.
Single buyer vs. multiple buyers The model of Section 2 assumes that there exists a single
buyer. Under the assumption of multiple buyers, our main result that investment promotion may
facilitate foreclosure - thereby worsening rather mitigating the concerns on the detrimental effect
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of ED - is still valid, as long as the incumbent is unable to elicit acceptance on exclusivity absent
the investment.
The recent literature on the ’foreclosing effect’ of ED has identified a number of situations
where this is the case:27 (i) when buyers are fierce downstream competitors; (ii) when downstream
competition is sufficiently weak but buyer power is strong or there are weak economies of scale
from the supply side; (iii) when the incumbent cannot discriminate contractual offers and fragmented buyers do not suffer from coordination failures; (iv) when the incumbent can discriminate
contractual offers but it is not profitable for it to fully compensate the critical number of buyers
such that entry is discouraged. Note that in this latter case the scope for investment promotion
to cause inefficient foreclosure is wider than in our model. Indeed, to make the ED signed and
inefficient foreclosure arise, it is not necessary that investment promotion is so strong to make
it profitable for the incumbent to compensate all the buyers, i.e to make the incumbent’s total
gain from exclusivity become larger than the loss suffered by all the buyers. It is sufficient that
investment promotion makes it profitable to compensate only the critical number of buyers such
that entry is discouraged.
Our result does not hold when, instead, the ED is signed even absent the investment. In
such a case inefficient foreclosure would occur anyway, and investment promotion would mitigate
(possibly remove) the welfare detrimental effect of ED.
Alternative renegotiation procedures Section 5 has analyzed the case where the exclusive
contract can be renegotiated, assuming a specific procedure that leaves the investing agent with
its disagreement payoff.
If we assumed that the renegotiation procedure gives the investing agent a share of the additional surplus generated by the more efficient entrant, on top of the disagreement payoff, we
should also take into account that the investment undertaken when the ED is renegotiable is lower
than the one made when the ED is not renegotiable. The intuition is that under renegotiation the
investing agent internalizes also the fact that higher investment decreases the entrant’s efficiency
advantage.28 In other words, even though under renegotiation the absolute payoff of the investing
agent is larger, it is less sensitive to investment and investment incentives are weaker as compared
with the situation where the ED cannot be renegotiated. Then, under feasible renegotiation it
would be less likely that ED stimulates investment. None the less, the conclusions obtained in
Section 5 would remain qualitatively the same.
Antitakeover provisions These results can be applied to contexts different from the debate
on ED, for instance to the corporate governance debate on the effects of antitakeover provisions
(ATPs). These are agreements that make it more difficult to replace the incumbent executives
with new ones after a takeover (which makes them similar to ED), thereby discouraging takeover
attempts.29 Such provisions include shareholder rights plans, staggered elections of Board of
Directors and golden parachutes (i.e. agreements between the firm and top executives specifying
that the latter will receive certain significant benefits if employment is terminated).
27

See Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991), Segal and Whinston (2000a), Fumagalli and Motta (2006).
Note that this holds irrespective of whether the external effect is positive or negative.
29
The seminal works of this copious literature are Lipton (1979) and Easterbrook and Fishel (1981). The debate
is summarised at lenght in Romano (1992), Bebchuck (2003) and Hannes (2006).
28
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The opponents of ATPs argue that they represent an obstacle to the correct functioning of
the market for corporate control because they discourage efficient takeovers, i.e. takeovers that
replace the incumbent management with a more efficient one. The proponents of ATPs argue
instead that they can exert beneficial effects that outweigh the above costs. In particular ATPs, by
making managers takeover-proof, can encourage them to undertake firm-specific non-contractible
investments or long-term investments whose returns are likely to be underestimated by (inefficient)
markets.30
Our paper contributes to this debate suggesting that the fact that ATPs foster investment does
not necessarily make their welfare detrimental effects less likely. Indeed, shareholders’ approval of
ATPs in the firm charter might be a proof that they are optimal from the firm’s perspective, while
being detrimental to society since they discourage efficient takeovers.
Covenants not to compete Our paper might also have a bearing on the literature on
covenants not to compete (CNCs) in labour contracts. Legal scholars have argued that the weak
enforcement of CNCs in California is key the economic success of Silicon Valley, because knowledge
sharing through labor mobility is facilitated (Gilson, 1999; Hyde, 2001). Still, other authors
claim that covenants not to compete protect firms’ intellectual property and enhance welfare by
stimulating investment in the employer-employee relationship (Rubin and Shedd, 1981; Glick et
al., 2002). Our paper warns that covenants not to compete might be welfare detrimentral precisely
because of investment promotion.

7

Policy implications

It is probably fair to say that there is consensus among economists that exclusive dealing should
be treated under a rule of reason. First, the plaintiff should make out a prima facie case of anticompetitive effects. At this stage, the plaintiff should also provide a theory of harm identifying the
exclusionary motives behind the concerned practice. Second, it would be upon the defendant to
prove that exclusive dealing serves efficiency goals (such as protection of investments) in the case
at hand. Finally, if both anti-competitive and efficiency effects are proved, an evaluation of the
magnitude of these effects, and a balancing of the two, should be made. Exclusive dealing would
be unlawful if the likely net effect is adverse.
Our analysis might affect the policy towards exclusive dealing in two respects. First, our
paper identifies a new situation where exclusive dealing might lead to exclusion of efficient rivals,
thus expanding the set of situations where a possible theory of harm exists. In particular, we
show that even absent fragmentation of buyers, scale economies and other well-known reasons
possibly leading to exclusion, exclusive dealing, by fostering investments, might make it easier for
an exclusive dealing contract deterring efficient entry to be signed.
Second, our analysis suggests that the balancing exercise of any anti- and pro-competitive effects
might be even more complex than already aknowledged, since we show that the very existence of
investment-promotion effects - rather than being only welfare beneficial - might actually make it
easier for exclusive dealing to foreclose efficient entry.

30

On the former, se Stout and Blair (1999). On the latter, see Stein (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Lipton
and Rosenblum (1991).
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A

Appendix

This Appendix contains the proof for the case where the ED is not renegotiable.

A.1

The incumbent invests

Proof of Lemma 1
Under exclusivity, the incumbent solves:
vI + x
x2
max
−γ
x
2
2




The optimal level investment is identified by the FOC
1
= γx∗ED .
2
Absent exclusivity, it is never optimal to invest if x ≤ (vE − vI )/(1 − λ). Investing x >
(vE − vI )/(1 − λ) makes the incumbent earn the profit:
πI (x) =

vI + x − vE − λx
x2
−γ .
2
2

The level of investment which satisfies the FOC
1−λ
= γx∗
2
is globally optimal iff
1
πI (x ) =
2
∗



1−λ
1−λ
vI +
− vE − λ
2γ
2γ


−γ

(1 − λ)2
>0
8γ 2

(6)

Condition (6) is satisfied iff
γ<

(1 − λ)2
≡ γ.
4(vE − vI )

Proof of Lemma 3
Case (i): Positive external effect. Take the investment fixed at x = x∗N oED . Introducing
exclusivity causes the incumbent a gain which is (weakly) lower than the buyer’s loss (see Table
1):31
∆πI (x∗N oED ) = πIED (x∗N oED ) − πIN oED (x∗N oED )
≤

ED ∗N oED
−[πB
(x
)

−

N oED ∗N oED
πB
(x
)]

(7)
= −∆πB (x

∗N oED

)

(8)

Also, by Lemma 2, when λ > 0 ED stimulates the investment (x∗ED > x∗N oED ). By revealed
preferences, this increases the incumbent’s payoff under exclusivity as well as the buyer’s payoff
ED (x) = (v + x)/2 is increasing in x), thereby expanding the incumbent’s gain and mitigating
(πB
I
the buyer’s loss.
When γ < γ, by Lemma 1, x∗N oED is such that vI +x∗N oED > vE +λx∗N oED . Hence, condition
(7) holds as an equality. It follows that ED, by promoting investment, makes the incumbent’s gain
31

We define as ∆πi with i = I, B the change of surplus of agent i due to the introduction of exclusivity.
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larger than the buyer’ loss and the incumbent is always able to elicit acceptance is a profitable
way:
πIED (x∗ED ) − πIN oED (x∗N oED ) > πIED (x∗N oED ) − πIN oED (x∗N oED )
= ∆πI (x∗N oED )
= −∆πB (x∗N oED )
N oED ∗N oED
ED ∗N oED
= πB
(x
) − πB
(x
)
N oED ∗N oED
ED ∗ED
> πB
(x
) − πB
(x
).

When γ ≥ γ, by Lemma 1, x∗N oED = 0. Since vI < vE by assumption, condition 7 holds as
a strict inequality. Hence, investment promotion must be strong enough to revert the inequality
and make the incumbent’s gain larger than the buyer’s loss:
vI + x∗ED
(x∗ED )2
vI + vE
vI + x
−γ
>
−
2
2
2
2

∗ ED

(9)

where x∗ED = 1/(2γ). Condition (9) is satisfied iff
γ<

3
≡ γ s > γ.
4(vE − vI )

Case (ii): Negative external effect.
By Lemma 2, if γ ≥ γ, ED promotes investment also when the external effect is negative. The
analysis made for the case of positive external effect applies: the ED is signed iff γ < γ s . However,
√
γ s > γ iff λ > 1 − 3 ≡ λs with λs < 0. Then, the ED is signed iff λ ∈ (λs , 0] and γ ∈ [γ, γ s ).
Instead, if γ < γ and the external effect is negative, ED limits investment: x∗ED < x∗N oED .
Take the investment fixed at x = x∗ED . When γ < γ, x∗ED is large enough to make the incumbent
ex-post more efficient: vI + x∗ED > vE + λx∗ED (more precisely, vI + x∗ED > vE + λx∗ED iff
γ<γ
b with with γ
b ≡ (1 − λ)/2(vE − vI ) > γ for any feasible value of λ). It follows that introducing
exclusivity (keeping the investment fixed at x∗ED ) causes the incumbent a gain which coincides
with the buyer’s loss (see Table 1):
∆πI (x∗ED ) = πIED (x∗ED ) − πIN oED (x∗ED )
 ED ∗ED

N oED ∗ED
= − πB
(x
) − πB
(x
) = −∆πB (x∗ED )

(10)
(11)

However, introducing exclusivity also limits the investment. The higher investment chosen
when exclusivity is absent increases both the incumbent and the buyer’s payoff absent exclusivity
N oED (x) = (v + x + v + λx)/2 and
(the former by revealed preferences, the latter because πB
I
E
λ ≥ −1), thereby decreasing the incumbent’s gain and increasing the buyer’s loss. It follows that
it is never in B and I 0 s joint interest to introduce exclusivity:

πIED (x∗ED ) − πIN oED (x∗N oED ) < πIED (x∗ED ) − πIN oED (x∗ED )
= ∆πI (x∗ED )
= −∆πB (x∗ED )
N oED ∗ED
ED ∗ED
= πB
(x
) − πB
(x
)
N oED ∗N oED
ED ∗ED
< πB
(x
) − πB
(x
).
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(When λ = 0, ED has no effect on investment and ED may be signed by indifference.)
Note that when exclusivity is absent, higher investment has a contrasting effect on the buyer’s
payoff. On the one hand, higher investment increases the value of trade with the incumbent, which
benefits the buyer; on the other hand, higher investment deteriorates the value of trade with firm
E which is detrimental to the buyer. Since we assume that the external effect is weaker than the
external one (i.e. λ ≥ −1), the former effect prevails and, absent exclusivity, the buyer is (weakly)
better off when the investment is higher. If we allowed the negative external effect to be stronger
than the internal one, higher investment would harm the buyer absent exclusivity. If this effect
was strong enough, B and I 0 s joint payoff would be higher when the ED is signed. Differently from
the case where the external effect is positive, B and I would have an incentive to enter into an
exclusive dealing contract because it stifles (rather than stimulates) the investment. An analogous
argument applies if we maintain the restriction λ > −1 and we allow for b < 1/2.The buyer’s payoff
absent exclusivity would be given by πB = b(vI + x) + (1 − b)(vE + λx). If λ < −b(1 − b), higher
investment harms the buyer. If λ < −2b/(1 − b), B and I are jointly better off under exclusivity.
Proof of Proposition 1
When γ < γ, firm E 0 s payoff is zero with and without the ED. Hence, total welfare coincides
with B and I 0 s joint payoff and ED is welfare beneficial whenever B and I have an incentive to
sign it.
When γ ≥ γ, firm E is harmed by the introduction of exclusivity, because it supplies the buyer
absent ED. Exclusive deal is welfare detrimental iff investment promotion is not strong enough to
make the increase in B and I 0 s joint payoff dominate the loss suffered by firm E :
vI + x∗ED
(x∗ED )2 vI + x
−γ
+
2
2
2

∗ ED

−

vI + vE
vE − vI
<
2
2

(12)

Condition (12) is satisfied iff
γ>

3
≡ γw < γs.
8(vE − vI )

Note that γ w > γ for any λ > 0. Hence, when the external effect is positive, the ED is signed and
p
is welfare detrimental iff γ ∈ (γ w , γ s ) . Instead, when λ ≤ 0 γ w > γ iff λ > 1 − 3/2 ≡ λww > λs
with λww < 0. Hence, when λ ∈ (λs , λww ], whenever the ED is signed it is welfare detrimental;
when λ ∈ (λww , 0], ED is signed and is welfare detrimental if γ ∈ (γ ww , γ s ).

A.2

The buyer invests

Proof of Proposition 2
Case (i): Negative external effect. Take the investment fixed at x = x∗N oED . Introducing
exclusivity causes the incumbent a gain which is (weakly) lower than the buyer’s loss (see Table
1):
∆πI (x∗N oED ) = πIED (x∗N oED ) − πIN oED (x∗N oED )
ED ∗N oED
N oED ∗N oED
≤ −[πB
(x
) − πB
(x
)] = −∆πB (x∗N oED )

(13)
(14)

Also, by Lemma 4, when λ < 0 ED stimulates the investment (x∗ED > x∗N oED ). By revealed
preferences, this increases the buyer’s payoff under exclusivity as well as the incumbent’s payoff
(πIED (x) = (vI + x)/2 is increasing in x), thereby expanding the incumbent’s gain and mitigating
the buyer’s loss.
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When γ ≤ γ
b◦ ≡ (1 − λ2 )/2(vE − vI ), x∗N oED is such that vI + x∗N oED > vE + λx∗N oED
and ∆πI (x∗N oED ) = −∆πB (x∗N oED ). It follows that ED, by promoting investment, makes the
incumbent’s gain larger than the buyer’ loss and the incumbent is always able to elicit acceptance
is a profitable way:
πIED (x∗ED ) − πIN oED (x∗N oED ) > πIED (x∗N oED ) − πIN oED (x∗N oED )
= ∆πI (x∗N oED )
= −∆πB (x∗N oED )
N oED ∗N oED
ED ∗N oED
= πB
(x
) − πB
(x
)
N oED ∗N oED
ED ∗ED
> πB
(x
) − πB
(x
).

Note that in this case firm E 0 s payoff is zero with and without the ED. Hence, total welfare
coincides with B and I 0 s joint payoff and ED is welfare beneficial whenever B and I have an
incentive to sign it. (When λ = 0, ED has no effect on investment and ED may be signed by
indifference.)
When γ > γ
b◦ , x∗N oED is such that vI + x∗N oED < vE + λx∗N oED and ∆πI (x∗N oED ) <
−∆πB (x∗N oED ). Hence, investment promotion must be strong enough to revert the inequality
and make the incumbent’s gain larger than the buyer’s loss:
vI + x∗N oED
vE + λx∗N oED
γ
vI + x∗ED
γ
vI + x∗ED
>
+
− (x∗N oED )2 −
+ (x∗ED )2
2
2
2
2
2
2

(15)

where x∗N oED = (1 + λ)/(2γ) and x∗ED = 1/(2γ). Condition 15 is satisfied iff
γ<

2 − 2λ − λ2
≡γ
es > γ
b◦ .
4(vE − vI )

Note that in this case firm E is harmed by the introduction of exclusivity, because it supplies
the buyer absent ED. Exclusive deal is welfare detrimental iff investment promotion is not strong
enough to make the increase in B and I 0 s joint payoff dominate the loss suffered by firm E :


vI + x∗N oED
vE + λx∗N oED
γ ∗N oED 2
vE + λx∗N oED − vI − x∗N oED
∗ED 2
∗ED γ
) −
+
− (x
) <
vI +x
− (x
2
2
2
2
2
(16)
Condition (16) is satisfied iff
4 − 2λ − 3λ2
γ>
≡γ
ew
8(vE − vI )
where γ
b◦ < γ
ew < γ
es for λ < 0.
Case (ii): Positive external effect.
By Lemma 4, ED limits investment: x∗ED < x∗N oED . Take the investment fixed at x = x∗ED .
Introducing exclusivity (keeping the investment fixed at x∗ED ) causes the incumbent a gain which
is (weakly) lower than the buyer’s loss (see Table 1):
∆πI (x∗ED ) = πIED (x∗ED ) − πIN oED (x∗ED )
 ED ∗ED

N oED ∗ED
(x
) − πB
(x
) = −∆πB (x∗ED )
≤ − πB

(17)
(18)

Also, introducing exclusivity limits the investment. The higher investment chosen when exclusivity is absent increases both the incumbent and the buyer’s payoff absent exclusivity (the
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latter by revealed preferences, the former because πIN oED (x) = max {0, vI + x − vE − λx)/2} and
λ < 1), thereby decreasing the incumbent’s gain and increasing the buyer’s loss. It follows that it
is never in B and I 0 s joint interest to introduce exclusivity:

πIED (x∗ED ) − πIN oED (x∗N oED ) < πIED (x∗ED ) − πIN oED (x∗ED )
= ∆πI (x∗ED )
= −∆πB (x∗ED )
N oED ∗ED
ED ∗ED
= πB
(x
) − πB
(x
)
N oED ∗N oED
ED ∗ED
< πB
(x
) − πB
(x
).

Note that when exclusivity is absent, higher investment has a contrasting effect on the incumbent’s payoff: by increasing the internal value, it makes the incumbent more efficient, but by
increasing the external value it also makes the rival supplier more efficient. Since we assume that
the external effect is weaker than the internal one, the former effect prevails and, absent exclusivity,
the incumbent is (weakly) better off when investment is higher.

B

Appendix

This Appendix contains the proofs for the case where the ED is renegotiable.

B.1

The incumbent invests

Proof of Proposition 3
In order to evaluate when B and I have an incentive to agree on exclusivity and the associated
welfare effects it helps distinguishing between the following two cases:
Case 1: γ < γ
b. In this case the investment chosen under exclusivity is large enough to make the
incumbent ex-post more efficient (vI + x∗ED > vE + λx∗ED ). Hence, the possibility to renegotiate
the initial contract is immaterial and the results obtained when ED is not renegotiable apply. It
follows that:
(a) when γ < γ, the ED is signed in equilibrium if and only if the external effect is positive
(when λ = 0, the ED may be signed by indifference); when the ED is signed it is welfare
beneficial.
√
(b) when γ ∈ [γ, γ
b) , the ED is signed iff γ < γ s . Recall that γ s > γ iff λ > λs ≡ 1 − 3 < 0
and note that γ s > γ
b iff λ > λss ≡ −1/2. Hence, in this case the ED is signed either for any
λ ∈ (λs , λss ) and γ ∈ [γ, γ s ); or for any λ ≥ λss and γ ∈ [γ, γ
b).
p
The ED is welfare detrimental iff γ > γ w .Recall that γ w > γ iff λ > 1 − 3/2 ≡ λww > λss
with λww < 0. Also, note that γ w < γ
b iff λ < 1/4 ≡ λw . Hence, in this case the ED is welfare
detrimental either for any λ ∈ (λs , λww ) and γ ∈ [γ, min{γ s , γ
b}); or for any λ ∈ [λww , λw )
and γ ∈ (γ w , γ
b).
Case 2: γ ≥ γ
b. In this case the possibility to renegotiate matters. More precisely, let us introduce
exclusivity keeping the investment fixed at the level x∗N oED = 0 chosen by the incumbent absent
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ED. The possibility to renegotiate removes foreclosure of the more efficient supplier E and makes
the incumbent’s gain equal to the buyer’s loss:
∆πI (x∗N oED ) = πIED (x∗N oED ) − πIN oED (x∗N oED )

(19)

N oED ∗N oED
ED ∗N oED
= πB
(x
) − πB
(x
) = −∆πB (x∗N oED )

(20)

However, remember that γ
b > γ so that ED stimulates the investment (x∗ED > x∗N oED ). Higher
investment increases the incumbent’s payoff under exclusivity (by revealed preferences), while the
effect on the buyer’s payoff depends on the sign of the external effect. The reason is that x∗ED is


not large enough to make the incumbent ex-post more efficient; then for x ∈ 0, x∗ED the buyer’s
ED (x) = (v + λx)/2.
payoff under exclusivity is πB
E
It follows that, when the external effect is positive, the investment stimulated by ED benefits
also the buyer. Hence, the buyer’s loss due to exclusivity is mitigated and the incumbent’s gain
is expanded, making the latter dominate. The incumbent can always elicit the buyer’s acceptance
in a profitable way.
Instead, when the external effect is negative, the higher investment stimulated by ED expands
not only the incumbent’s gain from exclusivity, but also the buyer’s loss. Then, it is not necessarily
the case that B and I have a private incentive to sign the ED. ED arises in equilibrium iff:
(x∗ED )2
vI + vE
vE + λx
vI + x∗ED
−γ
>
−
2
2
2
2

∗ ED

(21)

The stronger the negative external effect, the larger the buyer’s loss, the less likely that the
incumbent’s gain dominates. It turns out that the ED is signed iff
1
λ > − ≡ λss .
2
Hence, in this case the ED is signed for any λ ∈ (λss , 0] and γ ≥ γ
b.
Since the initial contract is renegotiable, firm E supplies the buyer also when the ED is in
place, but the investment promoted by ED reduces its efficiency advantage (recall that λ < 1) and
its payoff. In this case the condition such that firm E’s loss dominates the joint gain of B and I
is:
(x∗ED )2 vE + λx
vI + x∗ED
−γ
+
2
2
2

∗ ED

−

vI + vE
vE − vI
vE + λx∗ED − vI − x∗ED
<
−
2
2
2

This condition boils down to
λx∗ED − γ

(x∗ED )2
<0
2

and is satisfied iff
λ < 1/4 ≡ λw .
Hence, in this case the ED is welfare detrimental for any λ ∈ (λss , λw ] and γ ≥ γ
b..
To summarize, when the external effect is positive, the ED is always signed in equilibrium. It
is welfare detrimental iff λ ∈ (0, λw ) and γ ≥ γ w . If the external effect is (weakly) negative, the
ED is signed iff λ ∈ (λs , λss ) and γ ∈ [γ, γ s )- in this case, the signed contract is always welfare
detrimental; or λ ∈ [λss , 0] and γ ≥ γ - in this case the signed contract is welfare detrimental for
any γ > max{γ, γ w }.
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